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Firm innovation is key for many companies to continuously thrive in the 
marketplace.  Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to making innovative 
investments because of the upfront costs and riskiness of future returns.  This 
creates conflicts because managers are under pressure to meet short-term earnings 
forecasts.  A managers’ short-term focus on a firm’s business strategy may not be in 
the best interests of the shareholders’ long-term vision of a firm.  For this reason, a 
strong corporate governance system can trigger an increased level of monitoring of 
the decision-making of managers so that it’s aligned with shareholders’ goals.  
Often, a firm’s long-term strategy focuses on firm innovation.  A major influencer of 
a firm’s innovative strategy is its ownership structure.    This research specifically 
focuses on the impact of ownership concentration, institutional ownership, activist 
investors, large passive investors, and Board of Director composition on firm 
innovation.  Key components of a firm’s organizational structure, such as ownership 
concentration and Board member composition, are analyzed to explain the variance 
iv 
 
of innovation when other variables are controlled.  Based on a sample of technology 
firms, the findings show that publicly-traded information technology firms’ level of 
passive investors and percentage of independent Board members are significant 
relative to firm innovation.  There are also important findings from the unsupported 
variables, which are the firm’s ownership concentration of shareholders, activist 
investors, and institutional investors.  Finally, inferences are drawn from these 
results as to whether a firm’s ownership structure and governance affect a firm’s 
long-term strategy. 
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Preface 
 
The competitive environment in economic markets is changing so firms must 
adjust their focus at a rapid pace to experience growth.  The nature of firm growth is 
a heterogeneous, complex, and dynamic process that involves economic, social, and 
cultural factors (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005) and 
often requires a sound long-term strategy.  Many firms place a greater emphasis on 
meeting short-term results over adhering to a sustainable long-term strategy, which 
is known as short-termism (Graham & Campbell, 2001).  Contenders of firm short-
termism discuss the potential impacts of this phenomenon, such as discouragement 
for business managers from undertaking investments in innovation that yield returns 
in the long-term.  Business decisions that result from short-termism, which include 
decreased spending on innovative activities, add to the volatility of capital markets 
through rapid shifts in investment (Sappideen, 2011).   
An innovative strategy requires synergy creation between technologies, 
organizational structures, and operational processes to generate firm value, but there 
are complexities because innovative activities are typically long-term, risky, 
changeable, intensive, and idiosyncratic in nature (Holmstrom, 1989).  Innovative 
initiatives are delayed at firms because of the pressure to meet short-term earnings 
expectations, which are influenced by firm stakeholders (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 
1991; Kahan & Rock, 2007; Appel, Gormley, & Keim, 2015).  A firm’s organizational 
structure, which includes the Board and business managers, is influenced by the 
firm’s stockholders.  The most influential stockowners are the highly concentrated 
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ones.  Highly concentrated stockowners are often institutional investors, activist 
investors, and passive investors as well.  This research dissemination attempts to 
offer insights related to the relationship between ownership structure, firm 
governance, and level of innovative activity at publicly-traded IT firms. 
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
1.1.  Research Question 
How, if at all, are a firm’s ownership structure, governance, and level of innovative 
activity related? 
1.2.  Statement of Problem 
Innovation is key for firms to have a long-term competitive advantage from 
other firms in the market (Tian, & Wang, 2014).  Strategic investment in innovative 
activities is important for a firm to generate future economic returns (Franko, 1989), 
but investments in innovative activities involve a high probability of failure 
(Holmstrom, 1989).  In publicly-traded companies, the pressure to report regular 
income profits induces managers to focus on the short-term firm strategy (Porter, 
1992), which means that innovative activities are decreased because the benefits are 
typically observed in the long-term.  Firms trying to compete in the marketplace with 
innovation need an organizational structure that continuously and uninterruptedly 
supports innovative investment (Chen, Hsu, & Huang, 2010) despite competing 
business objectives. 
While innovation is necessary for some firms to grow, there are managers who 
focus on strategies other than innovative ones.  A firm’s ownership structure 
additionally influences a firm’s innovative strategy because stockowner type 
indicates the degree to which investors have influence over the Board and the firm’s 
strategy (Phan, Markman, & Balkin, 2016).  Three critical influencers of 
management’s decisions are highly concentrated shareholders, institutional 
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investors, and the Board (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991).  Bushee (1998) contends 
that the large ownership concentration by a few institutional investors allows them 
to monitor managers to ensure that managers choose innovative projects that 
maximize long-term value rather than focus on meeting short-term earnings goals.  
Hill and Snell (1988) find a higher proportion of non-independent Board members 
positively affects a firm’s level of innovative investment.  While ownership 
concentration and Board member composition influence a firm’s ownership structure, 
there are other significant investor types as well. 
Other influential stakeholders in a firm’s organization structure are active and 
passive investors.  In fact, activist investors are key players in both corporate 
governance and corporate control (Kahan & Rock, 2007).  Not only is this the case 
with activist investors, Appel, Gormley, & Keim (2016) suggest that large passive 
investors play a key role in influencing firms’ governance choices, which affects a 
firm’s level of innovation.  A firm’s organizational and ownership structure influences 
a firm’s level of innovation, which impacts its long-term strategy and results.    
1.3. Literature Review 
1.3.1.    Innovation.  Wang and Ahmed (2004) define innovation as the process 
of developing new products, services, methods of production, market segments, 
sources of supply, and organizational forms.  Shah and Chattopadhyay (2014) 
highlight that innovation occurs when a new replicable process is formed and is not 
a reinvention of an existing process or product; innovative processes are actions that 
satisfy customer needs and preferences and are neglected by rivals (Hilman & 
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Kaliappen, 2015).  Successful innovative projects increase a firm’s competitive 
advantage in the long-term and serve as a critical driving force for firm survival and 
growth (Schumpeter, 1934), but this is not without difficulties. 
Innovative projects are often complex, and the benefits from innovative 
activities are typically realized over long-term horizons.  Holmstrom (1989) argues 
that innovation is difficult to manage, has uncontrollable outcomes, and is limited by 
bureaucracy and financial constraints.  There are other deterrents to successful 
innovative projects, such as conflicts of interest between stockholders and managers, 
which are predominately driven by pressure for managers to meet short-term 
earnings expectations.   
Many firms suffer from agency problems, which arise when shareholders and 
managers have different goals and interests for the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The agency conflict is mitigated with a strict process of monitoring a manager’s ability 
to make business decisions that are solely focused on meeting short-term earnings 
targets, which is typically done by the Board and highly-concentrated shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The strict monitoring of management by shareholders is 
an example of a control process that occurs due to the separation between firm 
ownership and control of business decisions; this concept is highlighted by the 
incentive alignment effect. 
The incentive alignment effect relates to the separation of firm ownership and 
control and triggers stockowner confidence in the business decisions of managers 
when managerial incentives are aligned with the interests of stockowners (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976).  The incentive alignment effect is advantageous for several different 
firm strategies.  For example, the incentive alignment effect is helpful when a firm 
has an innovative strategy because both managers and stockowners are motivated to 
focus on firm innovation despite the risks.  Investment in innovative activities is a 
high-risk and high-return strategy, and many innovative activities do not lead to 
long-term ROI increases despite the potential for future high profits (Mansfield, 
1969).  Therefore, an innovative strategy can lead to lower short-term profits. 
Even when managers are focused on the firm’s long-term strategy, they always 
face pressures to meet short-term earnings expectations.  There are trade-offs 
between innovation and short-term earnings performance.  For example, managers 
are reluctant to invest in long-term innovative projects because of high failure rates 
that lead to short-term decreases in share price and net income (Mansfield, 1968).  
Investors may not promote a firm strategy that is focused on innovation due to limited 
understanding of the benefits that are associated with this strategy, which is an 
example of information asymmetry (Aboody & Lev, 2000).   
Information asymmetry leads managers to forego investments in innovation to 
boost short-term earnings performance and appease shareholder investment 
preferences, and this can be caused by the lack of information about the potential 
financial benefits that are from a firm’s innovative activities (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).  
Bebchuck and Stole (1993) show that when managers lack information or 
understanding about long-term innovative projects, they are more motivated to spend 
less on them.  A firm’s innovative activities are heavily monitored by managers, the 
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Board, and stockholders to alleviate information asymmetries and enable all 
stakeholders to make informed decisions about innovative investments.  If these 
projects are successful, the innovative process leads to a patented product. 
1.3.2.    Patents.  A patent is a legal device that gives firms the proprietary 
right to an invention for commercial purposes and results from innovative activities 
(Foray, 2010).  The extent to which firms use patents to protect their intellectual 
property rights is a central issue in the economics and legalities associated with 
innovation (Nicholas, 2010; 2011), and the inventor must openly disclose the technical 
details on the invention in exchange for patent rights (Foray, 2010).  Patents provide 
patent owners with exclusive rights, so they can choose when to make an investment 
with the patented product or concept.  This shows how patents create valuable real 
options (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002).  Patents are comparable to real options because 
they create the right, not the obligation, to realize the value of the underlying asset 
(Cotropia, 2009).  Patents and innovations have firm benefits, but it’s key for these 
initiatives to be monitored by members of a firm’s corporate governance system. 
1.3.3.    Corporate governance.  When analyzing a firm’s innovation strategy, 
it is important to understand the firm’s corporate governance model as well.  A firm’s 
corporate governance bridges the separation of stockowners, who are the risk-
bearers, and managers, who are the decision-makers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Corporate governance research focuses on the stockowners of a firm and suggests 
that innovative activity is enabled when there is a conducive ownership structure.  
This is because a firm’s ownership structure influences the allocation of funds, the 
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collaboration between stockowners and managers, and the cooperation of controlling 
and minority stockowners, which typically leads to improved internal control 
processes and financial results (Berle & Means, 1932).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
posit that the ownership structure of a firm is a function of the information 
asymmetries and agency costs that occur because of the separation of ownership and 
control between stockowners and managers (Francis, 1995).  A firm’s corporate 
governance model helps align the preferences between stockowners and managers, 
which becomes increasingly important when there is a high level of ownership 
concentration by a few shareholders. 
1.3.4.    Ownership concentration.  Highly concentrated stockowners monitor 
managers to ensure that their decisions are in the best interests of the company 
(Perry & Rainey, 1988).  Highly concentrated shareholders have incentives to monitor 
management’s decisions closely, so they focus on the firm’s long-term performance 
because of the amount of capital they have invested in the firm (Alchian, & Demsetz, 
1972).  Highly concentrated shareholders also have an ability to influence 
management.  Cubin and Leech (1983) find that highly concentrated stockowners 
have more power over management than less concentrated stockholders.  Highly 
concentrated stockholders influence a firm’s strategies and decision-making 
processes (Perry & Rainey, 1988). 
There is a positive correlation between ownership concentration by a few 
shareholders and incentive alignments between themselves and managers, which 
causes the highly concentrated shareholders to be entrenched in the firm’s daily 
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activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983a).  The incentive alignment effect implies that equity 
ownership belonging to a few shareholders gives them an incentive to optimize firm 
performance because it increases their personal wealth (Tsao & Chen, 2012).  
Incentive alignment problems arise due to the separation of ownership and control at 
publicly-traded companies (Berle & Means, 1932), which leads to reductions in long-
term firm value as managers make decisions for their own personal benefit (Levitas, 
Barker, & Ahsan, 2011).  Highly concentrated stockowners attempt to reduce 
incentive alignment problems as they become more entrenched in a firm by gaining 
more knowledge about the firm’s daily activities. 
As stockownership becomes more concentrated by a few shareholders, the 
concentrated shareholders become more informed on the firm’s daily activities 
because of the stockowners’ financial interest in the firm; this is known as the 
entrenchment effect (Tsao & Chen, 2012).  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
indicate that the entrenchment effect is frequently observed when stockowners are 
highly concentrated owners.  There are mixed findings related to whether highly 
concentrated stockowners become entrenched in a firm and impact the level of 
innovative activities.  Tsao and Chen (2012) find a negative correlation between the 
level of investments in innovative activities and ownership concentration.  Unlike 
Tsao and Chen (2012), Hill and Snell (1988) report a significant, positive relationship 
between the amount of R&D expense and concentration of equity ownership by a few 
shareholders, which suggests that highly concentrated stockowners encourage 
corporate investment in innovative activities.  Francis and Smith (1995) additionally 
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find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and innovation, which 
suggests that highly concentrated stockowners, such as institutional investors, prefer 
long-term firm strategies. 
1.3.5.    Institutional investor.  Institutional investors are financial 
institutions, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, banks, insurance 
companies, foundations, and endowments that hold a significant amount of equity in 
publicly-traded companies (Zhang & Gimeno, 2016).  The increase in stockownership 
from institutional investors has significantly impacted corporate governance over the 
past several decades.  To support this, institutional investors account for 
approximately 10% of traded equity in 1970 and over 60% of traded equity in 2006 
(Aghion, Van Reenen & Zingales, 2009).  The increase of institutional investor stock 
ownership presents a unique opportunity to bridge the information asymmetries 
between stock ownership and management (Lipton, 1987).  This is driven by an 
increased level of monitoring and influence by institutional investors and impacts the 
level of firm investment in innovative activities. 
There is evidence that long-term institutional ownership is positively 
associated with firm innovation (Zahra, 1996).  An explanation for this is that 
institutional investors have a fiduciary obligation to maximize long-term value for 
their customers, so they emphasize investment in firm innovation (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994).  Institutional investors pre-commit to long-term holding strategies 
rather than short-term focused ones so firm innovation is often a focus (Useem, 2015).  
When institutional investors prefer an innovative firm strategy, they have a large 
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amount of influence to get firms to adhere to an innovative strategy because a sell-off 
by an institutional investor will significantly drive down a firm’s stock price (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994).  The influence on a firm’s strategy by managers helps to minimize 
the effects of managerial myopia. 
Managerial myopia theory refers to the underinvestment by managers in long-
term, high-risk projects, such as R&D (Bushee, 1998).  Stein (1988; 1989) explains 
the increase in managerial myopic behavior by the short-term earnings preferences 
of shareholders, even when stockowners are rational investors.  According to the 
managerial myopia theory, institutional investors value short-term financial benefits 
over long-term potential gains (Kochhar & David, 1996).  Unlike many researchers, 
Graves (1988) finds a negative correlation between institutional investors and 
innovation; a plausible explanation for this is that money managers at institutions 
are reviewed and rewarded based on short-term periodic performance measures.  The 
prevalence of institutional investors at publicly-traded companies has shifted many 
firms’ corporate governance models and ownership structures, but activist investors 
are an even more dramatic driver of change at firms. 
1.3.6.    Activist investor.  Investor activism refers to actions taken by investors 
to pressure managers to do what the activist investor wants them to do (Parthiban, 
Hitt, & Javier, 2001) by using a strategy where an activist investor purchases a large 
stake in a firm with the open intent of influencing the firm’s policies and business 
activities (Klein & Zur, 2006).  An activist investor is a shareholder who wants a ROI 
that is larger than if the activist investor is passive.  An activist investor takes direct 
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action to get firms to change their behaviors to get a higher ROI (MacGregor & 
Campbell, 2008).  Investor activism highlights the dissatisfaction of shareholders on 
firm performance, which forces managers to focus on shareholder demands and the 
inadequacy of managerial decisions (Parthiban et al., 2001).   
Investor activism serves as a catalyst for change in an organization, has 
dramatic effects on firm performance, and acts as a trigger to decrease managerial 
power.  Investor activism makes managers more responsive to the needs of investors 
through increased monitoring by the activist investor and the Board (Parthiban et 
al., 2001).  Activist investors also work directly with managers.  Activist investors 
recommend specific courses of action to management.  If managers contest the 
recommendations, an activist investor tries to persuade management to follow the 
recommendations by enlisting other shareholders to suggest the activists’ course of 
action, seek a legal remedy, or launch a proxy battle (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008).  
Activist investor proposals typically have one of the following characteristics: 
• Preference of short-term financial results and short-term focused shareholders; 
• Emphasis on investments other than capital spending, R&D expense, 
acquisitions, and entrepreneurship; 
• Emphasis on shareholders over stakeholders (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008).   
Despite the findings from MacGregor and Campbell (2008), activist investors 
profit from industries that are heavily vested in R&D and innovation, such as firms 
in the IT industry.  In 2014, IT firms accounted for 20% of the firms that were an 
activists’ target; this was more than firms from any other industry outside of firms in 
11 
 
the financial services industry (Ovide & Clark, 2015).  Some noteworthy activist 
investors are Carl Icahn and Jana Partners.  These activist investors have amassed 
a large percentage of ownership interest in several large IT firms, such as Apple, 
Qualcom, and Microsoft, with the goal of altering each targeted firm’s excessive 
spending on innovative projects (Ovide & Clark, 2015).  When investing in IT firms, 
activist investors focus on strategic rather than excessive investment in innovation.  
Brav, Jiang, Song, & Tian (2016) support this by finding that a firm is more efficient 
on spending for innovative activities after the activist investor targets the firm.  
Investments in innovation are discretionary and can be perceived by an activist 
investor as wasteful spending by managers (Phan et al., 2016).  Many activist 
investors perceive unpredictable outcomes associated with the innovative process; 
they often conclude that there is a more active and efficient reallocation of the 
priorities set in the innovative process than the existing model (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
& Thomas, 2008a; 2008b).  This means that activist investors help managers to re-
prioritize how capital is allocated to innovative projects.  While there are mixed 
research findings on whether activist investors prefer innovative firms, the impact of 
passive investors on firm innovation is researched as well. 
1.3.7.    Passive investor.  Many institutions are passive investors and do not 
buy or sell shares to influence management’s decisions (Appel et al., 2016).  On the 
other hand, researchers argue that passive investors trigger idle shareholder 
engagement and weakened corporate governance (Kapadia, 2017).  There are mixed 
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conclusions about the effectiveness of manager monitoring by passive investors 
(Appel et al., 2016).   
Passive investors typically side with management’s decisions on a firm’s 
strategy more often than activist investors who motivate managers to adhere to 
investor preferences (Kapadia, 2017).  Unlike Kapadia (2017), Appel et al. (2016) find 
that the amount of equity owned by passive investors is negatively correlated with 
the percentage of votes in support of management proposals and positively correlated 
with the percentage of votes in support of governance-related shareholder proposals.  
Activist and passive investors have input in a firm’s strategy, but the Board seeks to 
drive initiatives that are independent of shareholder preferences. 
1.3.8.    Board.  Board members drive a firm’s corporate governance initiatives 
by negating any decision that demonstrates a lack of good faith for shareholders and 
other stakeholders (Man & Wong, 2013); this is set forth in the corporate by-laws.  
Corporate by-laws grant Board members the authority to endorse management 
initiatives, evaluate managerial performance, and direct management based on the 
criteria that best reflects shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a).  The Board 
serves as a safeguard that ensures that managers are acting in the best interests of 
shareholders and primary owner of a firm’s governance system (Williamson, 1984); 
the Board has governance over a firm’s innovative activities as well.   
Many researchers suggest that the Board routinely reviews innovative projects 
when analyzing the firm’s resource allocation methods (Casper & Matraves, 2003; 
Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Wright & Kroll, 2002).  The Board must 
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approve the annual budget and strategic plan submitted by management, which 
means they always directly influence the allocation of resources to innovative 
activities (Phan et al., 2016).  The Board also monitors managements’ activities 
beyond the approval of budgets and strategic plans.  The two main functions that the 
Board performs are to monitor and to advise management (Gu & Zhang, 2016). 
By monitoring and counseling management, the Board helps to link the 
interests of shareholders, who invest capital in a firm, and managers, who make 
decisions intended to create firm value (Monks & Minow, 2011).  Proponents of the 
agency theory suggest that monitoring is best done by independent Board members 
so there are no motivations to ignore certain managerial behaviors (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), which 
includes a short-term focus from a firm’s managers.  The Board is expected to promote 
strategies that benefit both stockholder short and long-term wealth (Baysinger et al., 
1991) so they do advise on innovative strategies.   
The Board facilitates successful innovative projects by offering knowledge and 
advisement on innovative projects to a firm’s management team (Xie & O'Neill, 2013).  
A non-independent Board member, who is also part of the firm’s operations, has a 
better understanding of the firm’s daily activities and is more effective than 
independent Board members at supporting an innovative strategy to increase long-
term firm value (Zahra, 1996).  Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also find that a Board 
that is independent will shy away from entrepreneurial activities, such as innovative 
ones, when advising on long-term strategies.   
14 
 
Unlike independent Board members, non-independent Board members have 
access to information that is relevant to assessing managerial competence and the 
strategic desirability of innovative initiatives (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  Firms 
that are focused on innovation are constantly facing uncertainty related to future 
technological advancements within the firm, and managers are unwilling to provide 
funding to innovative initiatives because of the potential for lack of future income 
gains (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  By including non-independent Board members 
in strategy planning sessions, managers are more motivated to focus on innovative 
strategies because non-independent Board members have more knowledge about a 
firm’s daily activities related to innovation.   
Fama and Jensen (1983a) find that the separation of ownership and control at 
a firm between stockowners and managers is properly governed when Board 
members independently monitor the decisions of managers.  Some theorists argue 
that independent Board members skew the direction of managerial effort from 
optimal risky innovative strategies to more conservative ones despite many 
shareholder preferences for the optimal risky ones (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  
On the other hand, independent Board members are more likely to protect the 
interests of shareholder’ preferences for innovative activities because their personal 
wealth is not tied to the outcomes of those decisions (Phan et al., 2016).  While the 
Board drives a firm’s corporate governance, managers steer a firm’s strategy, which 
includes the amount of capital that is invested in firm innovation. 
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1.3.9.    Manager.  An agency problem arises because managers are focused on 
unprofitable or short-term strategies that are not parallel with shareholders’ long-
term company vision (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Managers make decisions about 
future investments that impact the current share price, perceived employment 
growth, and increased compensation and benefits (Bushee, 1998).   These decisions 
are not always in the firm’s best interests.  This is known as the managerial myopic 
theory and relates to the pressures that managers have, which causes them to 
sacrifice long-term interests to boost short-term profits (Lee, 1997).  Only the top 
managers in an organization determine the strategy related to matters such as 
innovation and financial leverage, which is why corporate governance is so important 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989).   
A corporate governance model offers incentives to managers to focus on 
innovation, and there needs to be careful monitoring for innovative activities to be 
profitable (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  He and Wang (2009) support this concept by 
describing two key features of innovative-intensive firms as having a high degree of 
information asymmetry between stockowners and managers and possessing 
substantial managerial discretion for making decisions about the deployment of 
innovative knowledge.  Managers are incentivized to invest in projects with faster 
payoffs, which are often projects other than innovative ones, because of the potential 
for increased short-term returns (Zeng & Horn-Chern, 2011).  After all, returns from 
innovative projects often require considerable time and do not facilitate managerial 
short-term goals (Laverty, 1996).  While a firm’s corporate governance influences the 
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level of innovative activities, a firm’s status as being publicly-traded influences the 
level of innovative activities as well.   
1.3.10. Public versus private IT firms.  Firm innovation is crucial for privately-
held firms to be competitive in the marketplace (Wright, Hoskisson, Filatotchev, & 
Buck, 1998).  Bernstein’s (2015) research shows that once a firm goes public, the 
amount of firm innovation decreases.  Bernstein (2015) theorizes that once a firm 
goes public, the strategy changes related to the level of innovative activities.  To 
support this, managers are more motivated to engage in innovation when a firm is 
private versus public (Francis & Smith, 1995; Wright, Robbie, Chiplin, & Albrighton, 
2000a; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, 2000b).  A positive relationship between private 
ownership and innovation is driven by an easing of the effects of the agency conflict 
theory (Xie, 2012). 
Private ownership is an effective way to solve the agency problem because of a 
better alignment between stockholders and managers, which leads to strong 
incentives to create more wealth for the firm and each other (Xie, 2012).  The 
privatization of a firm offers a supportive governance model that fosters innovative 
business activities and serves as a corporate restructuring method (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2002).  Firms are privately-held because they believe that this will improve 
firm performance.  Privately-held firms maximize innovative initiatives to dominate 
in various market segments because details of innovative activities are hidden from 
potential competitors when a firm is privately-held (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2013).   
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It is expected that stockholders and managers are more motivated to focus on 
innovative strategies at privately-held companies (Wright et al., 2000b).  Research 
shows that firms pursuing an IPO realize a decline in the quality of their innovations 
once they go public due to inventor departures and post-IPO productivity decreases 
(Bernstein, 2015).    Harvard economist, F.M. Scherer, suggests that there is more of 
an affinity for innovative risk-taking from smaller privately-owned firms over 
corporations; this helps to explain why many of the most important innovations have 
originated outside of large corporations (Crouch, 2008).  As is seen, most researchers 
confirm that private firms focus on innovation more than public firms. 
1.4. Hypothesis 
H1:  A firm’s ownership and organizational structure significantly impacts a firm’s 
level of innovation when a firm’s Leverage, ROA, and Book to Market Value of Equity 
are controlled, all else being equal. 
 The separation of ownership and control in publicly-traded corporations 
creates differing views of the ideal firm strategy from the perspectives of the manager 
and stockholder (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Shareholders, for the most part, are 
focused on helping to foster long-term firm value despite the goal of managers to gain 
personal benefits such as power, status, and wealth by focusing on meeting short-
term financial goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Highly-concentrated stockowners, 
such as activist, passive, and institutional investors, work closely with managers to 
pursue a firm strategy that creates long-term value that is often focused on 
innovative activities (Chen, Li, Shapiro, & Zhang, 2014).    
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A firm’s corporate governance defines the roles of each member in a firm’s 
organization structure of the Board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, 
and this sets the rules for making decisions on corporate affairs (Ramaswamy, Ueng, 
& Carl, 2008).  From an agency perspective, firms with a high number of independent 
Board members are more likely to make extensive evaluations of strategic decisions 
and management behavior (Luo, 2007), which includes the amount of capital to 
allocate on firm innovation. 
H2:  As the level of ownership concentration by a few shareholders increases at a 
publicly-traded IT firm, the level of innovative activities increases, all else being 
equal. 
Large shareholders mitigate agency problems that are driven by the 
misalignment of goals between investors and managers (Prowse, 1990), which 
includes conflicting interests regarding a firm’s strategy (Lee, 1997).  When 
stockowners have a highly concentrated stockownership interest, it is easy for them 
to coordinate change at a firm and demand information from management, which 
overcomes information asymmetries (Berle & Means, 1932).  Francis and Smith 
(1995) find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and R&D 
expenses.  Similarly, Lee (2005) offers empirical evidence that shows that ownership 
concentration by a few shareholders affects firm innovation. 
H3a:  When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one activist investor vested in the 
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal. 
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As it pertains to publicly-traded firms, short-termism refers to companies that 
focus on being profitable in the short-term with little regard to whether the business 
decisions they make will decrease firm value in the long-term; this typically entails a 
decrease in spending on innovative activities (Rose & Sharfman, 2014).  Activist 
investors are often accused of suffering from short-termism to obtain a quick ROI 
(Kahan & Rock, 2007).  Clifford (2008) provides evidence that firms that are targeted 
by activist investors experience increases in operating profitability, leverage, and a 
dividend yield, but a decrease in cash levels (Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2009).  Based on 
this research, the level of spending on firm innovation decreases at firms to increase 
a firm’s operating profitability. 
H3b:  When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one passive investor vested in the 
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal. 
Appel et al. (2016) find that there are several reasons why passive investors 
seek to improve firms’ governance choices and performance, which are primarily 
motivated by fund fees that are received in relation to the performance of assets under 
management.  An increase in passive investors is associated with an improvement in 
a firms’ future performance (Appel et al., 2016).  Also, passive investors create an 
environment that might be conducive for activist investment.  Activist investors are 
known to gauge the support of a firm’s largest passive institutional investor base 
before pursuing demands from managers (Appel et al., 2016).  Because of this, passive 
investors influence firm spending on innovation simply by enticing activist investors 
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to target the same firms that they own.  In turn, passive investors directly and 
indirectly increase the level of spending on firm innovation. 
H4:  As the number of shares owned at a publicly-traded IT firm by institutional 
investors increases, the amount of innovative activities increases, all else being equal. 
Many researchers show that institutional investors value investment in 
innovative activities (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Kochhar & David, 
1996; Zahra, 1996).  This is explained by the fact that institutional investors prefer 
holding shares of stock in the long-term (Useem, 2015).  Institutional investors also 
have legal obligations to their investors to have a portfolio that maximizes returns 
(Useem, 2015) so they favor companies that make innovative investments that are 
likely to improve long-term performance.   Prahalad (1994) suggests that many 
institutional investors cannot sell their ownership stake in a firm without 
significantly lowering the firm’s stock price (Lee, 1997).  This puts pressure on 
managers to adhere to institutional investor requests, which are typically to focus on 
the firm’s long-term strategy, such as an innovative one. 
H5:  Once an IT firm is a public-traded company (as opposed to being private), the 
level of patents and innovation decreases, all else being equal. 
When firms are privately held, the agency issues associated with the 
separation of ownership and control are not as severe as publicly-traded companies 
because the owners are also managers (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2013).  Private ownership 
is an effective method to solving the agency problem because of the alignment 
between the stockowner and manager, which creates incentives to create more 
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personal wealth (Xie, 2012).  Because of this, private ownership is expected to have a 
positive impact on innovation (Zahra, 1995), and there are many reasons for this 
phenomenon.  There is pressure at publicly-traded companies to control costs, which 
leads to decreased spending on innovative activities.  Innovation at publicly-traded 
firms is undervalued because investors may not fully price the potential increase in 
firm value that result from innovative activities (Cohen, Diether, & Malloy, 2013).  
Based on these facts, it is more beneficial for private firms to invest in innovation in 
comparison to publicly-traded firms. 
H6:  As the number of non-independent Board members increases, a publicly-traded 
IT firm has an increased number of innovative activities, all else being equal. 
The Board is one of the key influencers of corporate governance, which helps to 
balance the agency conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Williamson, 1984).  Hill and Snell (1989) report a significant 
negative relationship between independent Board members and the level of 
innovation.  This is explained by the fact that independent Board members have less 
knowledge of the businesses in comparison to non-independent Board members.  
With less access to information, independent Board members are less willing to focus 
on innovative strategies because they have a higher perceived risk of innovative 
projects.  A non-independent Board member better understands the importance of a 
firm’s innovative activities and perceives these as being less risky than an 
independent Board member. 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
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2.1.  Sample of Attributes 
For all the hypotheses, the dataset is from the NASDAQ’s website, which lists 
3,195 firms.  All companies not in the technology sector are excluded from the sample, 
which decreases the number of firms in the sample to 433.  Five companies are 
subsequently excluded from the sample because they don’t have market 
capitalization numbers readily available, which decreases the sample to 428.  The 
100 firms with the largest market capitalization make up the sample population for 
hypotheses 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and 6.  During the data collection phase, there are 22 
additional firms excluded from the sample due to the following reasons: 
• Foreign (Non-US) issuer that does not file SEC 10-K, 
• Sample lacks Board member data, 
• Sample does not have or lacks some years of SEC 10-K filings, 
• Company divests during one of the sample years, and 
• Company launches an IPO during one of the sample years. 
The sample population is 77 firms.  For Hypothesis 5, the sample consists of IT firms 
that became publicly-traded firms from 2008 to 2016, which is an initial sample to 
66.  Any firms that had no patents issued are excluded as well.  The final sample size 
is 29.     
2.2. Variable Measurement 
Appendix A provides summary information related to the Independent, 
Dependent, and Control Variables.  This section provides detailed information about 
these sources.   
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2.2.1.  Independent Variables.   
2.2.1.1.  Activist Investor.  SEC Schedule 13D requires investors, who intend to 
influence corporate control, to disclose their ownership and intent within 10 days of 
having a sizable percentage of equity ownership in a public-traded firm (Brav et al., 
2009).  The SEC Schedule 13D filing is an important source for understanding 
investor activism since it provides information about the identity of the filer, filing 
date, ownership, cost of purchase, and most importantly, the purpose of the 
investment (Brav et al., 2009).  As such, an organization’s SEC Schedule 13D filing 
is the source used to gather the level of activist investors for each firm in the sample.   
2.2.1.2.  Passive Investor.  A passive shareholder buys and holds shares of stock 
and sells them when the investment goal is met or a more attractive use for the funds 
comes along (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008).  SEC Schedule 13G is a quarterly filing 
for an investor who passively holds a beneficial ownership interest in a firm with no 
intent to directly influence change at the firm (Giglia, 2016). As such, an 
organization’s SEC Schedule 13G filing is used to measure large passive investors.   
2.2.1.3.  Institutional Investor.  Any financial institution exercising 
discretionary management of investment portfolios over $100 million in qualified 
securities is required to report those holdings quarterly to the SEC using Schedule 
13F (Appel et al., 2016).  Legislative history indicates that “institutional trading also 
has an impact on brokerage services and on the securities industry,” and it is 
reasonable to conclude that the SEC Schedule 13F disclosures help to foster a safer 
and informed securities market (Pekarek, 2007).  Institutional investors own a large 
24 
 
equity percentage of stock in firms so their SEC Schedule 13F reports are heavily 
monitored.  As such, an organization’s SEC Schedule 13F filing is used to measure 
institutional investors. 
2.2.1.4.  Independent Board Member.  Prior to a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting, shareholders receive a Proxy Statement, which is required by the SEC 
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The Proxy Statement 
provides information so that shareholders can make informed decisions at an annual 
or special stockholder meeting.  The Proxy Statement includes voting information, 
background information on Board members, executive compensation details, a list of 
the members of the Board audit committee, and a breakdown of audit and non-audit 
fees that are paid to the firm’s primary auditor.  Proxy Statements also provide 
information about Board member composition.  Independent Board members are not 
on the top management team and do not have a past relationship with the firm.  Non-
independent Board members are top management team members who are part of the 
firm’s existing daily operating function. 
2.2.1.5.  Ownership Concentration.    Ownership concentration is an important 
variable and a frequently used measurement of HHI.  The HHI is calculated using 
the following formula (Ginevičius & Čirba, 2007; 2009): 
 
d = the market share of i-th enterprise 
N = the total number of enterprises in market 
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 The values of the HHI are between zero, which signifies a market with perfect 
competition where each firm in a population owns an equal percentage of ownership 
of the market, and one, which constitutes a pure monopoly where one firm dominates 
the market (Krivka, 2016).  The HHI is a cumulative concentration indicator using 
the market shares of the enterprises as their weights (Krivka, 2016).   For purposes 
of this study, the HHI is used to calculate ownership concentration, which is the 
percentage of equity ownership by highly concentrated shareholders divided by total 
common equity stockownership of shares outstanding at a firm.  There are other 
methods of using the HHI to calculate ownership concentration.  For example, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) calculate the HHI by calculating the ownership 
concentration of the top five and top 20 shareholders. 
2.2.2.  Control Variables.   
2.2.2.1.  Leverage.  A firm’s leverage shows how much of a company’s assets 
belongs to creditors versus shareholders.  This is an important metric because it can 
drive whether firms make an investment in innovative activities.  Phillips (1995) 
shows that firms with considerable amounts of debt in comparison to equity must 
focus on short-term cash flow generation to cover the debt obligations rather than 
make investments in innovative activities.  There are indications that the 
relationship between debt-financing and innovative investment is negative (Ortega-
Argiles, Moreno, & Caralt, 2005).  Other previous studies suggest that firms prefer 
equity-financing to debt-financing of R&D activities (Chen et al., 2010).    
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2.2.2.2.  ROA.  Firm performance influences spending on innovation (Chaney 
& Devinney, 1992).  This is typically measured with one of two performance 
indicators, which are ROA and ROE.  ROA is a metric for operating performance and 
reflects the earning power of a business (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015).  Firm 
operating performance is important because a poorly performing firm has no choice 
but to cut spending on innovative activities to improve net income results and 
maintain existing share price.  
2.2.2.3.  Market to Book Value of Equity.  Market value of equity is the total 
dollar market value of company’s outstanding shares and is calculated by multiplying 
the company’s current stock price by its number of outstanding shares.  The book 
value of equity is the value of stockholder’s equity as reflected on a firm’s balance 
sheet.  The market to book value of equity figure represents the difference between 
what the market assesses to be the economic value of common equity and what the 
financial statements under GAAP report (Beaver & Ryan, 1993).   
2.2.3.  Dependent Variable. 
2.2.3.1.  Innovation.  Patents serve as a metric of the effectiveness of a firm’s 
innovative activities (Levitas et al., 2011).  Schmookler (1962; 1966), and Sokoloff 
(1988) agree that patent counts are the standard measure for innovation (Moser, 
2016).  Patents inform a firm’s shareholders and stakeholders of the innovative 
capabilities of the firm, which reduces information asymmetries between stockowners 
and managers (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).   
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A firm’s size influences the amount of expenditures on innovation (Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1989).  Many researchers suggest that a firm’s size may be an important 
determinant of R&D expense and innovation because of economies of scale, and many 
empirical studies find that smaller firms generate more innovation per dollar of R&D 
expense than larger ones (Kim, Lee, & Marschke, 2009).  There are studies that depict 
the opposite of this, which is summarized by the Schumpeterian hypothesis.  The 
Schumpeterian hypothesis is based on the premise that large firms are more 
innovative than small ones for the following reasons: 
• Large firms benefit from economies of scale and scope that make them more 
competitive in comparison to their smaller competitors; 
• Large firms benefit from complementarities and spillovers between different 
departments; 
• Large firms are favored by capital markets for the financing of risky innovative 
projects (Peeters & de la Potterie, 2006). 
For these reasons, the Dependent Variable is a measure of innovation, and this is 
calculated by dividing patents by number of employees. 
2.3.  Methodology 
Hypothesis H1, H2, H3a, H3b, H4, H6:  Patent data is gathered for the top 100 
publicly-traded IT firms from the USPTO’s website for the period of 2005 through 
2015.  Each company in the sample is listed as the Assignee Name on the patent 
application.  Patent issue date is the metric that defines the year that the patent is 
counted; patent issue date is chosen over application date because this is the date 
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that the innovative activities can be deployed under patent protection laws.  The 
number of stock shares from SEC Schedules 13-D, 13-F, and 13-G filers is gathered 
annually for the period of 2005 – 2015.    This data is collected using two different 
methods with the following process: 
 
2005 through 2015 data – 13-F 
The data is sourced from WhaleWisdom, which is an aggregator of publicly 
available financial information related to financial institutions who are required by 
law to file forms with the SEC.  WhaleWisdom collects these figures daily.  
WhaleWisdom’s data collection process is done in-house and is automated with little 
to no human intervention. 
 
2006 through 2015 data – 13-D and 13-G 
The data is collected from WhaleWisdom. 
 
2005 data – 13-D and 13-G 
WhaleWisdom does not have data for 2005; this data is sourced from the SEC’s 
website. 
 
Board member information is from the SEC’s website in the annual Schedule 
10-K documents.  Each firm’s end-of-year share prices are sourced from the Yahoo 
29 
 
finance website.  All other financial metrics are from the Mergent Online, which is a 
financial database system. 
Hypothesis H5:  Patent data for the IT firms in the sample is from the USPTO website.  
The initial population is the top IT firms that are traded on the NASDAQ Exchange 
and listed on the NASDAQ’s website.  The collection period of the data is from 2008 
to 2016 and excludes any pre-2007 data, so results aren’t skewed by the U.S. stock 
market crash.  In 2007, The U.S. stock market experienced the worst crash in 
financial history since the Great Depression (Meric, Welsh, Weidman, & Marmon, 
2011).  After the data collection phase, an average is calculated for each sample to 
create the Independent and Dependent Variables pre and post IPO. 
3. Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics:  Table 1.1 summarizes the summary statistics for the data 
(excluding Hypothesis 5).  The mean number of patents is 108, but there is a firm in 
the population with 3,161 patents in a year.  The sample population comprises of 
larger firms so the average balance sheet figures for total assets, total liabilities, and 
total equities is large.  The average assets, liabilities, and equity (in millions) are 
respectively 6,800.59, 2,935.34, and 3,836.49.  The average net income of the sample 
population is 1,057.01.  The average R&D expense / sales is 467.25, but the standard 
deviation is 1,397.38.  The average number of employees is 10,101, and the maximum 
number of employees is 221,700. 
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H1:  A firm’s ownership and Board structure significantly impacts a firm’s level of 
innovation when a firm’s Leverage, ROA, and Book to Market Value of Equity are 
controlled, all else being equal. 
 The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, 
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variables 
(Institutional Investor, Passive Investor, Activist Investor, Independent Board 
Member, and Ownership Concentration) predict the variances in the level of firm 
innovation (Patents / # of Employees).  As in seen in Table 1.2, there is a significant 
F-test (F(19, 750) = 3.48, p < .01) so we can interpret R2 (0.08) as significant.  
Therefore, 8.00% of a firm’s level of innovation is explained by the Independent 
Variables and Control Variables.  The significant regression coefficients are Passive 
Investor (b = 0.51) and Independent Board Member (b = 0.29).  Therefore, Hypothesis 
1 is partially supported.  
H2:  As the level of ownership concentration increases at a publicly-traded IT firm, 
the level of innovative activities increases, all else being equal. 
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA, 
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Ownership 
Concentration) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of 
Employees).  As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) = 
2.15, p < .01)) so we interpret the R2 (0.04) as significant.  4.00% of innovation is 
explained by the Independent Variable and the Control Variables.  The significant 
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regression coefficients are ROA (b = 11.22), Market to Book Value of Equity (b = -
8.23), and Year 2014 (b = 8.14).  Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.   
H3a:  When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one activist investor vested in the 
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal. 
The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, 
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Active 
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of 
Employees).  As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 185) = 
2.01, p < .05)).  The R2 (.04) is significant, and 4.00% of the variance of a firm’s level 
of innovation is explained by the Independent Variables and Control Variables.  The 
only significant regression coefficient is ROA (b = 11.40).  Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is 
not supported. 
H3b:  When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one large passive investor vested in 
the firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal. 
The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, 
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Passive 
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of 
Employees).  As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) = 
2.35, p < .01)), and the R2 (0.04) is significant, and 4.00% of the variance of a firm’s 
level of innovation is explained by the Independent and Control Variables.  In 
examining regression coefficients related to Hypothesis 3b, several regression 
coefficients are significant: ROA (b = 12.75), Year 2014 (b = 8.57), Passive Investor (b 
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= 8.26), and Market to Book Value of Equity (b = -7.58).  Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is 
supported.  
H4:  As the number of shares owned by institutional investors at a publicly-traded IT 
firm increases, the level of innovative activities increases, all else being equal. 
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA, 
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Institutional 
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of 
Employees).  As is seen in Table 1.3, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) = 
2.16, p < .01)) so we can interpret the R2 (0.04) as significant.  4.00% of the variance 
of innovation can be explained by the Independent and the Control Variables.  The 
regression coefficients that are considered significant include ROA (b = 10.64), 
Market to Book Value of Equity (b = -8.43), and Year 2014 (b = 8.04).   Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
H5:  Once an IT firm is a public-traded company (as opposed to being private), the 
level of patents decreases, all else being equal. 
 As can be seen in Table 1.3, the means between post-IPO and pre-IPO are 
respectively 1.19 and 0.45.  The standard deviations between post-IPO and pre-IPO 
are 0.60 and 0.56.  As in seen in Table 1.4, the model includes the Independent 
Variable ANOVA results (Pre-IPO) and Dependent Variable (Post-IPO).  The model 
did not have a significant F-test (F(0, 13) = 4.11, p > 0.05).  There are no significant 
regression coefficients.  Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.   
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H6:  As the number of non-independent Board members increases, a publicly-traded 
IT firm has an increased number of innovative activities all else being equal. 
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA, 
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Independent 
Board Member) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of 
Employees).  As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 646) = 
3.90, p < .01)) so we interpret the R2 (0.07) as significant, and 7.00% of the variances 
in innovation are explained by the Independent and the Control Variables.  The 
significant control variable regression coefficients are Independent Board Member (b 
= -18.02) and ROA (b = 11.15).  Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
4. Discussion 
Based on regression results, a firm’s percentage of equity ownership by large 
passive investors influences its level of innovative activities.  Black (1992) supports 
these findings and states that there is an incentive for passive managers to improve 
their overall performance because fund fees are based on the financial performance 
of assets under management.  Unlike the findings from Black (1992), Appel et al. 
(2016) find little evidence of a change in a firms’ debt issuances, capital expenditures, 
R&D expenses, or acquisitions when a large passive investor is present.  Aghion et 
al. (2013) also find that there is no association between a firm’s level of large passive 
investors and firm innovation. 
 Based on regression results, a firm’s number of independent Board members 
(as opposed to non-independent ones) influences its level of innovative activities.  
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Osma (2008) posits that independent Board members are likely to question 
managerial decisions and constrain cuts on innovative activities.  An increase in 
independent Board members facilitates and improves the monitoring of managers, 
which helps to ensure that they undertake profitable innovative activities (Chen, 
2013).  This is supported.   
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that a firm’s percentage of 
ownership concentration by highly concentrated shareholders impacts a firm’s level 
of innovative activities.  These findings are contradictory to the findings by Hill and 
Snell (1988) who report a significant, positive relationship between the level of R&D 
spending in 94 large research-intensive companies and highly concentrated owners.  
Francis and Smith (1995) also find a positive correlation between ownership 
concentration by a few shareholders and R&D spending.  One plausible explanation 
for this is that R&D spending is the measure of innovation rather than patent count.  
Unlike Hill and Snell (1988) and Francis and Smith (1995), Chandler (1990) finds 
that a high concentration of equity ownership by a few stockholders leads to risk 
avoiding choices like minimizing spending on innovation.  Unfortunately, the 
unsupported findings of this research do not support this either. 
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that the percentage of equity 
ownership by a firm’s institutional investors impacts the level of firm innovation.  
This is unlike Graves’ (1988) findings, which shows a negative correlation between 
institutional ownership and R&D spending.  The unsupported findings are 
contradictory to Eng and Shackell (2001) who find a positive correlation between 
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institutional ownership and the amount of R&D at firms.  Aghion et al. (2015) find a 
positive correlation between the amount of equity ownership by institutional 
investors and firm innovation.  Some researchers suggest that institutional investors 
emphasize short-term financial results, which implies less spending on innovative 
activities (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, 1987).  The unsupported finding from this research 
does not necessarily contradict this conclusion, but it doesn’t support the finding 
either.   
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that a firm’s percentage of 
equity ownership by activist investors impacts the level of firm innovation.  This is 
contrary to critics of activist investors who claim that activist investors focus on short-
term gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value (Kahan & Rock, 2007; Brav 
et al., 2008).  The findings in this research study are contradictory to Aghion et al. 
(2013) who find a positive correlation between a firm’s level of institutional investors 
and firm innovation.  Interestingly, the results from this research are supported by 
(Brav et al., 2016) who observe that R&D spending drops significantly during a five-
year period after an activist investor has a substantial ownership stake in a firm, but 
the level of innovative outputs, which is measured by patent counts and citation 
counts per patent, does not drop.  These findings suggest that activist investors 
trigger efficient investments in innovation. 
 Based on the regression results, IT firms do not perform less innovative 
activities after an IPO is launched, and the firm goes public.  These findings are not 
consistent with Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) whose results show that private 
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firms take more risks, invest more in new products and technologies, and pursue 
more radical innovations.  Similarly, Zahra (1995) finds that private ownership has 
a positive impact on firm innovation.  Many other researchers support the notion that 
private ownership contributes to firm innovation (Francis & Smith, 1995; Wright et 
al., 2000a; Weight et al., 2000b).   
5. Importance of this Research 
 The aim of this research is to support the notion that a firm’s ownership 
structure and governance model impacts the level of innovative activities that occur, 
which is also influenced by the decisions made by managers.  The separation of 
ownership and control in large publicly owned firms has induced potential conflicts 
between the interests of managers and stockholders (Baysinger et al., 1991; Berle & 
Means, 1932; Marris, 1964); this impacts the amount of capital funds that are 
allocated innovative activities.   A firm’s ownership structure influences the amount 
of innovation that occurs at firms, but it is unclear which ownership structure model 
is the most conducive for an innovative strategy to be successfully deployed (Chen et 
al., 2012).   
There is contradicting evidence related to how the Board’s composition and the 
firm’s ownership structure impact the level of innovative activities that occur at a 
firm.  Firms must innovate to remain competitive in the market and thrive in the 
long-term.  Unfortunately, short-term earnings results are important too, which is 
often the focus of managers.  This research supports Baysinger et al. (1991) who posit 
that the knowledge about the impact of institutional investors, which includes both 
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active and passive investors and independent Board members, on strategic strategies, 
such as innovative ones, is still very limited. 
6. Further Research 
Research shows that innovative companies have some common traits.  Dominant 
themes in innovative firms are that they are focused on inventive and pioneering 
ideas (Miller, 1993).  An innovative firm’s general approach to doing business is to be 
faster and execute at a larger scale and more frequently.  Further research needs to 
be done to determine how high the returns in the long-term are at innovative firms 
in comparison to non-innovative ones. 
 There needs to be further research on the impact of Board composition on a 
firm’s strategy.  Gender diversity on Boards is a widely researched topic due to some 
surprising statistics that women account for only 16.9% of Board members of Fortune 
500 companies and 11.9% of Board members in Russell 3000 firms (Pargendler, 2016).  
Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel (2016) use meta-analysis to measure the direct 
effects that women’s representation in positions such as CEOs, top management 
teams, and the Board, have on financial performance.  The researchers suggest that 
women’s leadership affects a firm’s financial performance.  This is a perfect example 
of a topic that can be expanded upon. 
 There needs to be further research on the ease at which firms can successfully 
innovate post-IPO versus when they have a private-ownership structure.  Spiegel and 
Tookes (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2014) show that there is a significant correlation 
between public versus private status of a firm and the nature and extent of innovation 
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activities.  Guo and Zhou (2016) find that firms with greater expansion and progress 
of their product pipelines in the first three years of IPOs have greater abnormal 
returns during the same period.  Guo and Zhou (2016) also suggest that innovation 
capability is critical to stock performance and firm survival.  These are interesting 
topics to further explore.   
7. Limitations 
1. Patent data fails to capture innovation that occurs outside of the patent system.  
Patents are the outputs of innovative activities; R&D expenses are the inputs of 
innovative activities (Chemmanur, Loutskina, & Tian, 2014).  Firm innovation does 
not necessarily need to be patented because companies might rely on trade secrecy of 
their invention over obtaining a patent.   Kamien and Schwartz (1982) find that there 
are shortcomings with patent statistics because many patents never commercialize 
or are used for minor modifications of existing products.   
Despite this limitation, the goal of this research is to gauge innovative activities 
that are unique to the firm so patent data is the most appropriate measure of firm 
innovation.  There are several studies that use patent data as a measure of firm 
innovation (Kogan, Papanikalaou, Seru, & Stoffman, 2012; Seru, 2014).  Chemmanur 
et al. (2014) justify this approach because patent data captures actual innovation 
output and the effectiveness of a firm’s use of its innovation inputs, which is typically 
measured by R&D expense. 
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2. The use of the HHI as a proxy for ownership concentration is inaccurate because 
of the difficulties of fully accounting for every concentrated stockowner at a firm 
(Krivka, 2016).   
The HHI is important for purposes of this analysis, but every concentrated 
shareholder is not captured.  This data is sourced from the SEC Schedules 13-F, 13-
G, and 13-D.  A different approach to measuring ownership concentration is seen in 
Aghion et al. (2015) where the HHI measure is based on the ownership concentration 
of the top five shareholders. 
3. The data source for activist investors, institutional investors, and passive 
investors has a potential for data error. 
Most of the data related to each samples’ SEC filings is sourced from 
WhaleWisdom.  WhaleWisdom collects their data within the company, and the 
process is entirely automated with little or no human intervention.  Without human 
oversight, there is a greater risk that the data error exists since we are relying on the 
filer to provide accurate information. 
4.  The patent issue date is used rather than patent application date when collecting 
patent data for the sample. 
In this research, patent issue date is used.  This is the date when all R&D 
activities are legally sanctioned and validated to allow the patent’s assignee to have 
the exclusive use of the patented idea or product, and an innovative output is 
confirmed.  Contrary to this approach, Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988) find that the 
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choice of application (rather than grant) year better captures the actual time of 
innovation. 
5. Patent data is used to measure innovation versus R&D expense. 
A firm’s R&D expense is the input variable for innovation; these are the upfront 
costs that are spent for innovative activities to occur and potentially improve a firm’s 
value (Chemmanur et al., 2014).  Patents are the output variable of innovation; 
patents occur once the innovative activity has created a business concept or product 
that a firm or person wants to have sole proprietary rights to use.  Because patents 
are the measure of innovation rather than R&D expense, there are variances in 
results of research studies that use R&D expense as the measure of firm innovation.   
For example, Hill and Snell (1998) find a meaningful relationship between R&D 
expense and the level of equity ownership by institutional investors.  The findings in 
this research do not support the notion that there is a relationship between firm 
innovation, as measured by patents, and the level of equity ownership by institutional 
investors. 
6. The sample population consists only of IT firms that are traded on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange. 
The findings of this research will be different if the sample population is gathered 
on firms that are in different industries or traded on different stock exchanges.  In 
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016), the sample is the index constituents for the Russell 
1000 and Russell 2000 indices, which serves as an alternative source for company 
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data.    This limitation can always be alleviated by changing the sample population 
in further research. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
 
Descriptive Summary of All Variables in Hypothesis 1-4 and 6 
 
Variable 
Type 
Variable Type Method Source 
Independent 
Variable 
Activist 
Investors 
% ownership 13-F Filings from 
SEC’s website 
and Whale 
Wisdom 
Independent 
Variable 
Institutional 
Owners 
(Passive) 
% ownership 13-G Filings from 
SEC’s website 
and Whale 
Wisdom 
Independent 
Variable  
Institutional 
Owners 
(Active) 
% ownership 13-D Filings from 
SEC’s website 
and Whale 
Wisdom 
Independent 
Variable 
Board of 
Directors 
Independent 
Board 
Members / 
Total Board 
Members 
Annual Proxy 
Filings from 
SEC’s Website 
Independent 
Variable 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman 
Index 
Filings from 
SEC’s website, 
WhaleWisdom, 
and Mergent 
Online 
Control 
Variable 
R&D expense / 
sales 
R&D expense / 
Annual Sales 
Mergent Online 
Control 
Variable 
Leverage Total Debt / 
Total Equity 
Mergent Online 
Control 
Variable 
ROA Net Income / 
Total Assets 
Mergent Online 
Control 
Variable 
Market to 
Book Value of 
Equity 
(Company 
Share Price * 
Outstanding 
Shares) / 
(Value of 
Equity – 
Preferred Stock 
Equity) 
Mergent Online 
Dependent 
Variable 
Patents (Number of 
Patents) / 
Number of 
Employees 
US Patent 
Website 
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9. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1 
Summary Statistics for the OLS Regression (t-test) Model (Hypothesis 1-4 and 6) 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of 770, which represents 
77 publicly-traded IT firms over a period of 2005-2015.  The statistics are calculated 
at the firm level.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean Mediam Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 25 50 75
Patents 108.29          -               394.91          -               3,161.00       -               -               36.00            
Assets 6,800.59       938.26          23,801.52     21.43            290,479.00    432.51          938.26          3,517.42       
Liabilities 2,935.34       326.85          11,448.72     -               171,124.00    116.23          326.85          1,420.10       
Equity 3,836.49       637.02          12,767.68     -               123,549.00    241.96          637.02          2,135.66       
Net Income 1,057.01       88.36            4,364.83       0.23              53,394.00     32.45            88.36            356.33          
R&D / Sales 467.25          86.38            1,397.38       10.64            10,062.00     43.21            86.38            237.83          
# of Employees 10,101.15     2,494.00       22,636.30     111.00          221,700.00    987.50          2,494.00       7,455.75       
N = 770
* Assets, Liabilities, Equity, Net Income, and R&D / Sales are in millions
** All variables but Patents and # of Employees are in dollars ($)
Percentiles (%)
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Table 1.2 
OLS Regression (t-test) Results for Hypotheses 1-4 and 6 
 
This table presents the Standardized Coefficients, t-values, N, r2, and F-test for the 
sample of 770, which represents 77 publicly-traded IT firms over a period of 2005 – 
2015.  The statistics were calculated at the firm level.  All variables (Years 2006 – 
2015, Institutional Investor, Passive Investor, Activist Investor, Independent Board 
Member, Ownership Concentration, Leverage, ROA, and Market to Book Value of 
Equity) are treated as Independent Variables, and Innovation is the Dependent 
Variable.  These are the regression results for all hypotheses but the fifth hypothesis. 
 
 
1 2 3a 3b 4 6
Dependent Variable:  Innovation
Control Variables:
2006 0.38 1.66 (2.95) 1.57 1.67 (2.08)
36.91 34.46 (60.80) 32.59 34.68 (43.89)
2007 0.38 1.13 (0.70) 1.09 1.20 (0.04)
25.74 23.19 (14.41) 22.45 24.74 (0.94)
2008 0.38 1.41 (1.13) 1.04 1.56 (0.05)
21.57 28.79 (23.32) 21.12 31.76 (1.10)
2009 0.38 2.34 (0.90) 2.61 2.30 0.64
43.33 48.27 (18.63) 53.91 47.26 13.46
2010 0.38 0.77 (1.48) 0.84 0.81 (1.19)
2.95 15.93 (30.56) 17.48 16.67 (25.10)
2011 0.38 4.39 2.38 4.06 4.52 2.42
70.28 90.50 49.01 83.81 93.21 50.95
2012 0.38 4.87 2.69 5.19 4.85 2.62
87.75 100.22 55.64 107.28 99.72 55.03
2013 0.38 4.91 2.73 5.06 4.92 3.02
89.12 101.27 56.46 105.05 101.71 63.58
2014 0.38 8.14* 5.93 8.57* 8.04* 6.28
160.81 167.87 122.82 177.92 165.69 132.37
2015 0.38 7.54 5.48 7.84 7.49 6.39
154.36 154.67 113.50 162.32 153.55 134.53
Leverage 0.06 (6.45) (5.89) -6.34 (6.40) (6.33)
(133.96) (145.47) (131.68) (143.40) (144.33) (145.07)
Return on Assets 1.33 11.22*** 11.40*** 12.75*** 10.64*** 11.15***
305.23 294.89 299.29 331.83 277.49 297.66
Market to Book Value of Equity 0.03 (8.23)* (8.80) (7.58)* (8.43)* (6.65)
(139.43) (183.03) (194.36) (168.25) (187.61) (149.71)
Independent Variables
Ownership Concentration 0.91 5.50
(98.49) 151.89
Activist Investor 0.87 (2.55)
(68.64) (70.06)
Passive Investor 0.51** 8.26**
218.08 224.52
Institutional Investor 0.98 5.70
111.28 156.24
Independent Board Member 0.29*** (18.02)***
(512.73) (509.26)
N 770 770 770 770 770 770
r2 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07
F-test 3.48*** 2.15*** 2.01** 2.35*** 2.16*** 3.90***
This table represents OLS regression data, which is comprised of the Standardized Coefficent (t-value).  All 
coefficients and t-values have been multiplied by 100.  *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3 
Summary Statistics for the Hierarchical Regression Model (Hypothesis 5) – Pre / 
Post IPO 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for 29 publicly-traded IT firms over a 
period of 2008 – 2016.  The summary statistics are calculated at the firm level.  There 
are no Control Variables.  The Independent Variable is Pre-IPO patent data, and the 
Dependent Variable is Post-IPO patent data. 
 
 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev N
Post-IPO 1.19                  0.60 29.00       
Pre-IPO 0.45         0.56         29.00       
Innovation
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Table 1.4 
Regression Results for the Hierarchical Regression Model (Hypothesis 5) – Pre / 
Post – IPO Data 
 
This table presents the regression statistics for 29 publicly-traded IT firms over a 
period of 2008 – 2016.  The regression statistics are calculated at the firm level.  There 
are no Control Variables.  The Independent Variable is Pre-IPO patent data, and the 
Dependent Variable is Post-IPO patent data.   
 
 
 
B Beta t p
(Constant) 0.94       4.95           0.00           
Pre-IPO 0.55       0.51       2.03           0.07           
F 4.11       
R 2 0.26       
N = 29
p > .05
Innovation - Post - IPO
